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Abstract  
The phenomenon of tax evasion has proved to be a common challenge across both the developing and 
developed countries. This may be considered a vital threat to national revenue of any government, and 
results in fiscal deficits. In the case of the developing countries, Palestine depends heavily on the 
revenue from tax and funds coming from international aids in financing the national growth plan. 
Hence, this study aims at examining the interrelationships among tax fairness, peer influence, 
corruption, and income tax evasion based on the theory of Social Influence. The procedure involved a 
proportionate sampling of the targeted respondents, and the data collection was achieved quantitatively 
by means of appropriate questionnaires. The returned questionnaires were screened and only 184 were 
useful for analysis. The analysis of the data was done by means of Partial Least Square (PLS) software. 
The outcome of the data analyses revealed that both peer influence and tax fairness had a negative but 
significant influence. Regarding corruption, it was insignificant though was positive in relation to the 
evasion of the income tax. This finding implies that the income tax administration efficiency can make 
a maximum gain from tax collections as well as discourages tax evasion. 
Keywords: Tax evasion, tax fairness, peer influence, corruption. 
  
1. Introduction 
Essentially, each government relies on generating revenues via sources that can be tax and non-
tax in order to execute projects and offer services to their citizens (Alm & Torgler, 2011). In other 
words, tax revenue represents the earliest and most sustainable means of accruing revenue by the 
governments worldwide for supporting their expenses. Consequently, a greater part of the economy of 
most countries is based on taxation (Abuamria, 2019; Edwin, 2011). In this regard, the degree to which 
any government is able to generate revenues depends on a lot of factors (Torgler, 2005; Alshrouf, 2019). 
However, the willingness of a taxpayer to adhere to the tax laws remain a major factor in attaining a 
high level of tax collection by voluntary compliance. According to Kirchler (2007), the inability of 
taxpayers to abide by the important provisions of tax law signifies the existence of tax evasion. 
Consequently, tax evasion remains a main challenge confronting the tax authorities all over the world 
and its practice continues to rise and become more difficult to be tackled due to creative ways and 
dynamism of tax evasion schemes (Alleyne & Harris, 2017). As such, Franzoni (2000) refers to tax 
evasion as the most rampant and decisive challenge confronting tax administrations. Therefore, tax 
evasion could be considered an intentional dishonest act of reducing tax responsibility by the taxpayers 
(Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, & McClellan, 2016). 
Being a developing country, Palestine depends to a large extent on tax revenue and aids from 
international bodies as source of fund for national growth along with development (Alkhatib & Abdul-
Jabbar, 2017). Hence, Palestine’s income tax administration is characterised by having serious 
        International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology 
  Vol. 28, No. 17, (2019), pp. 690-700 
 
691 
 
ISSN: 2005-4238 IJAST  
Copyright ⓒ 2019 SERSC 
 
 
challenges related to tax evasion (Alkhatib, Abdul-jabbar, & Marimuthu, 2018; Rahhal, 2017). More 
recently, the “Coalition for Integrity and Accountability in Palestine” projected that 500 million USD 
is lost annually from the Palestinian treasury as a result of tax evasion (Coalition for Accountability and 
Integrity, 2018) or between USD 500 and USD 600 million as reported by Jaber (2018). Regarding the 
income tax evasion, the Finance Minister stressed that 80% of people accounted for just 10% of the 
income tax (Bishara, 2015).  
Although in Palestine SMEs constitute 99% of business taxpayers, as they contribute only 30% 
of the total revenues from income tax. The results is a reduction of the expected size of revenue from 
these SMEs (Fallah, 2014) and implies that several SMEs are highly engaged in tax evasion (Sabri, 
2010). Due to the present rate of tax evasion activities in Palestine, a necessity arises to present a 
detailed evaluation of the crucial economic factors influencing tax evasion in order to formulate the 
required policies for raising the revenues of the government.
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Tax Fairness and Tax Evasion 
Tax fairness is considered a non-economic variable that determines tax evasion and an important 
factor in taxpayers’ decision-making (Farrar, Kaplan, & Thorne, 2017). Some taxpayers take part in tax 
evasion act, whereas at the same time, the sincere taxpayers continue to meet their taxes obligation 
because of their strong perception towards the need to fulfil tax obligations. When the government 
enforces taxes increment, the new tax may increase the burden on taxpayers, thereby encouraging them 
to engage in tax evasion (AlAdham, Abukhadijeh, & Qasem, 2016).  In this context, Farrar et al. (2017) 
infer that the intention to comply with tax is higher when the interactional fairness is high. Accordingly, 
Richardson (2006) assessed the correlation between tax fairness and tax evasion and found an inverse 
relationship implying that greater levels of tax fairness leads to a lesser tax evasion rate. In addition, 
scholars added that when the tax system is considered unfair, taxpayers tend to be less compliant 
(Wenzel, 2002) or transactions with the tax authorities are unfair (Wenzel, 2006). In contrast, some 
studies reported an insignificant influence of tax fairness on tax evasion. Notably, Porcano (1984) 
reported the relationship existing between the vertical tax fairness as well as tax evasion is insignificant. 
Likewise, other studies such as Faizal and Palil (2015) and Saad (2009) in the Malaysian context 
reported similar findings. 
Accordingly, studies point out that there exist negative relationship between the perception 
towards tax fairness as well as tax evasion. That is, when tax fairness is perceived as high, it result in a 
higher compliance attitude (Akdede 2006; AlAdham et al. 2016; Chan Troutman and O’Bryan, 2000; 
Fischer et al. 1992; McGee and Maranjyan 2006). However, few other studies have found an 
insignificant effect of tax fairness on tax evasion (Porcano 1984; Faizal and Palil 2015; Saad 2009). 
Considering the above discussion related to tax fairness-tax evasion relationship, the current study 
proposes the following hypothesis: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between Tax Fairness and Tax Evasion. 
2.2. Peer Influence and Tax Evasion 
Peer groups are highly influential in shaping the individuals’ preferences, values as well as their 
behaviours (Al Zeer, Alkhatib, & Alshrouf, 2019). The notion of ‘peer’ is commonly defined as 
associates of taxpayers including their friends, relatives, colleagues, and co-workers (Jackson & 
Milliron, 1986). The influence of peer groups on tax taxpayers is high, thus affecting the taxpayers’ 
preferences, personal values, and behaviours (Puspitasari & Meiranto, 2014). In taxation perspective, 
the attitude of other taxpayers influences the compliance behaviour of other taxpayers (Alm et al. 2016). 
Hence, the propensity of any taxpayer to file tax return will be high if he/she has the perception that 
other taxpayers are also complying with their tax duties. Therefore, the choice of decision by a taxpayer 
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could be influenced by his/her peers, friends as well as co-workers, individuals or groups like the family 
(Beck & Ajzen, 1991). When the taxpayers perceives the existence of high tax evasion among some 
particular referent groups, their likelihood of compliance will be very low (Kirchler et al., 2008). 
Accordingly, the belief of taxpayer’s towards other taxpayers’ compliance attitude determines his/her 
compliance decision. In other words, taxpayers are less inclined to be dishonest regarding their taxes 
payment if peers act honestly (Frey & Torgler, 2007; Traxler, 2010). Thus, having a better opinion 
related to the compliance rate of other associates of the society could decrease the degree of tax evasion 
(Çevik and Yeniçeri, 2013) and vice-versa.  
In summary, previous studies have established a significantly negative effect of peer influence 
on tax evasion (Alleyne & Harris, 2017; J Alm et al., 2016; Beck & Ajzen, 1991; Çevik & Yeniçeri, 
2013; Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001; Kirchler et al., 2008), whereas only few extant studies have 
revealed an insignificant effect (Hanno & Violette, 1996; Hite, 1988; Palil, Zain, & Faizal, 2012). 
Consequently, the following hypothesis is derived: 
H2: There is a negative relationship between peer influence and tax evasion. 
2.3. Corruption and Tax Evasion 
Corruption results from payment of a particular sum of money by an individual as an exchange 
for an illegal activities involving public officer (Andreoni et al., 1998). Based on the perspectives of 
McClellan (2013), corruption practices tend to greatly reduce the revenue capacity of the government 
since any taxpayer could easily evade tax relying on bribes paid to the government tax officials instead 
of paying full taxes. The challenges of corruption are widely spread, whereas the sources of corruption 
are yet poorly comprehended by the policy makers (Carvalho et al., 2016). It seems that corruption is 
regarded as a growing threat in the majority of the developing countries (Alabede, 2012) since some 
public officials are mostly self-centred to abuse public trust to achieve personal benefits (Alm et al., 
2016). Consequently, corruption has been established to show significant determinant of tax conformity 
behavior (Alm et al., 2016; Torgler, 2003) which discourages taxpayers from the payment of their taxes 
(Uslaner, 2010), thus limiting the taxpayers’ compliance behaviour (Torgler, 2003). In this regard, 
Bilotkach (2006) showed that corruption among the employees of tax authority in Ukraine has a 
considerable effect on tax evasion. Nevertheless, few other empirical studies revealed opposing 
findings. For instance, Akdede (2006) focused on bribery among the government officials and found 
that bribery has a negative relationship with tax evasion. This shows that taxpayers could willingly 
decide paying taxes rather than engaging in corruption when the cost of bribery is huge. Also, Imam 
and Jacobs (2014) established that the relationship between corruption and total tax revenue is 
insignificant. 
In addition, several extant empirical findings revealed a positive influence of corruption on tax 
evasion (Alm et al., 2016; Bilotkach, 2006; McGee & Maranjyan, 2006; Picur & Riahi-Belkaoui, 2006; 
Uslaner, 2010), whereas a few studies have indicated that the relationship between them are either 
negative (Akdede, 2006) or insignificant (Imam & Jacobs, 2014). Therefore, in an effort towards 
improving the knowledge on relationship between corruption and tax evasion, this study proposes 
hypothesis as follows:  
H3: There is a positive relationship between corruption and tax evasion. 
3. Research Framework  
The model for the current study is shown in Figure 1 below. The model is developed based on 
the Social Influence Theory, proposing that the perceived tax fairness, peer influence, and corruption 
affect the tax evasion behavior. The Social Influence Theory focuses  on the individual’s emotions, 
opinions or behaviours as affected by other individuals (Sussman & Gifford, 2013). The theory of Social 
Influence is linked to the Social Learning Theory, founded by Bandura’s (1977) initiative that an 
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individual is influenced by the surrounding environment. Crisp and Turner (2007) explained that the 
social influence is associated with the way individual’s thoughts, feelings and behaviour are altered due 
to the influence of other individuals.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Research Model  
4. Methodology 
The current study employed data gathered at level of business entity depicting the unit of analysis 
of the study. Data was retrieved from total of 500 SMEs registered with “the Federation of Palestinian 
Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture”. The distribution of questionnaires was 
implemented using a proportionate random sampling method among the selected respondents, namely 
SMEs owners or managers. Questionnaire dissemination covers a period of two months with about 184 
analysable data retrieved post screening of the questionnaires, this represented 37% response rate. 
The variables as well as items deployed in the research study were all adapted through extant 
studies. Responses to items were based on five-point Likert-scale with options covering strongly 
disagree as 1 down to strongly agree as 5, all through variables in the study. Total of 15 items that 
measured tax evasion were all adapted from Giligan and Richardson (2005). Also, for the aims of 
increasing the internal validity a reverse coding approach was applied in item 5 for this study (Efebera 
et al., 2004), but  this was not the case in the original study by Gilligan and Richardson (2005). Tax 
fairness was measured by 7 items which were adapted from Gilligan and Richardson (2005)”, whereby 
the items 1, 2 and 3 were used in reverse coding, and the current study also adopted the same items in 
measuring tax fairness. Peer influence with 6 items were adapted from Braithwaite (2001), whereby a 
reverse coding technique was applied for the case of item 5 of this study. In addition, corruption was 
measured using 6 items which was adapted from Martin et al. (2007). 
5. PLS Data Analysis and Results 
In evaluating the model of this research, the study employs the Partial Least Squares (PLS) 
analysis technique through Smart PLS 3. The analysis of the measurement model (constituting the 
relationship amongst variable alongside their indicators) were done by employing two stage analytical 
technique recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). Similar method was as well applied to test 
the structural model (which is the relationships between the variables) in this study (Hair et al. 2017). 
5.1. Assessment of Measurement Model 
Assessing measurement models involved two (2) measurements of validity including convergent 
alongside discriminant validity. While convergent validity is measured through the loadings of 
indicators, average variance extracted (AVE), and composite reliability. The results are presented in 
Table 1; “the loading for all the items was found to exceed minimum threshold of 0.50. The values 
ranged from 0.608 to 0.888, the AVE values ranged from 0.500 to 0.706, and they were as well above 
recommended threshold of 0.50, whereas the composite reliability values also varied from 0.836 to 
0.935, and these also exceeds recommended threshold of 0.70 (Hair et al., 2017). However, the items 
Tax Fairness 
Peer Influence Tax Evasion 
Corruption 
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number 7, 10, and 15 for tax evasion, and items number 7, 6, and 6 for tax fairness, peer influence, and 
corruption, respectively were deleted due to the low indicator loadings. Finally, considering the 
outcomes, the present study is argued to have a reliable convergent validity. 
Table 1. Convergent validity 
Variables Items Loading CR AVE 
Tax Evasion  TE1 0.740 0.923 0.500 
TE2 0.729   
TE3 0.740   
TE4 0.746   
TE5 0.734   
TE6 0.680   
TE8 0.696   
TE9 0.671   
TE11 0.673   
TE12 0.709   
TE13 0.698   
TE14 0.658   
Tax Fairness  TF1 0.835 0.935 0.706 
TF2 0.888 
TF3 0.781 
 TF4 0.859   
 TF5 0.844   
 TF6 0.832   
Peer Influence PI1 0.741 0.895 0.632 
PI2 0.835   
PI3 0.773   
PI4 0.868   
 PI5 0.750   
Corruption CO1 0.681 0.836 0.508 
CO2 0.680 
CO3 0.608 
 CO4 0.829   
 CO5 0.748   
After establishing the convergent validity, another test that was followed is the discriminant 
validity based on the criterion by Hair et al. (2017). The measurement involves comparison between 
square root of AVE along with correlations values of latent variables. The result is presented in Table 
2, whereby the square roots of AVE’s were all greater for all the cases as compared to diagonal values 
from each rows and columns. Therefore, the adequacy of the discriminant validity is confirmed. 
Generally, the result obtained from validity tests of the measurement model in the current study 
indicates a satisfactory outcome for convergent as well as discriminant validity. 
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Table 2. Discriminant Validity Analysis 
 Variables TE TF PI CO 
Tax Evasion (TE)  0.707    
Tax Fairness (TF) -0.283  0.840   
Peer Influence (PI) -0.314  0.369  0.795  
Corruption (CO)   0.104 -0.107 -0.053 0.713 
 
5.2. Assessment of Structural Model 
Strength of prediction for the current research model represented by R-square (R2)  or the 
coefficient of determination gives an account of the shared contribution of the exogenous and 
endogenous factors in the study (Hair et al., 2017). By using the Smart PLS algorithm function, the R2 
value was measured to show the quantity of variation which the exogenous variables accounts for (Hair 
et al., 2017). Hence, these three variables have R2 value of 0.136 which indicates that 13.6% of the 
variation in the income tax evasion is jointly explained by tax fairness, peer influence, and corruption. 
Next, a bootstrapping was carried out by applying 5,000 re-sampling from 184 cases in order to 
assess the significance of the path coefficients (β) applying the one-tailed test. Thus, the results of the 
path estimates as well as the t-values were as well measured with respect to the hypothesized 
relationships of this present study. The outcome of the analysis of the structural model is presented in 
Table 3. Based on the parameters of tax fairness (β = -0.186; t = 3.059; p = 0.001) along with those of 
peer influence (β = -0.242; t = 3.205; p = 0.001), the result indicates a negative association with tax 
evasion, thus affirming hypotheses H1 and H2. Accordingly, the result showed an insignificant influence 
of corruption on tax evasion. Hence, H3 is not supported (β = 0.072; t = 0.626; p = 0.266). 
Table 3. Results of Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis: Path Path Coefficient  T-Statistics P-Value Decision 
H1: Tax Fairness -> Tax Evasion -0.186 3.059 0.001** Supported 
H2:  Peer Influence -> Tax 
Evasion 
-0.242 3.205 0.001** Supported 
H3: Corruption -> Tax Evasion   0.072 0.626   0.266 Not Supported 
Note: Significant at **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. 
5.3. Predictive Relevance  
Aside from the R2 value, the predictive relevance (Q2) is considered another valuable statistic 
which employs resampling technique (Henseleret al., 2009). In order to assess the predictive relevance 
of the endogenous variable, the blindfolding technique was employed with multiple or single item in 
the reflective measurement model (Hair et al., 2017). In accordance with Hair et al. (2017) and Henseler 
et al. (2009): “a cross-validated redundancy measure Q2 value which is greater than zero implies the 
predictive relevance of the model”. As a result, the result for this test disclosed that the model of this 
present study exhibits predictive relevance for endogenous factors as presented in Table 4. 
Table 4. Variable Cross-Validated Redundancy (Q²) 
Endogenous latent variable SSO SSE 1-SSE/SSO 
Tax Evasion  2,208.000 2,090.794 0.053 
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6. Discussion 
The targeted objective of the study was the assessment of the influence of tax fairness, peer 
influence, and corruption on income tax evasion among the SMEs owners-managers. The manner in 
which taxpayers conceive a tax system to be fair is a vital determinant of tax evasion choice (Kostritsa 
& Sittler, 2017). The current study has established that the relationship of tax fairness and income tax 
evasion is significantly negative. Accordingly, the outcome of the present study are in line with the 
most existing empirical literature that also confirmed a significant and negative influence of tax fairness 
on tax evasion (Alm, Jackson, & McKee, 1992; Belay & Viswanadham, 2016; Cummings, Martinez-
Vazquez, McKee, & Torgler, 2009; Farrar et al., 2017). This outcome could be because the SMEs’ 
owners-managers perceive fairness in the tax system. As a result, they were motivated to comply with 
tax payment. Thus, fairness in the tax system promotes compliance, and this is in harmony with the 
Theory of Social Influence. Consequently, encouraging tax fairness and equity in the Palestinian tax 
system will achieve the target of reducing tax evasion among the Palestinian SMEs. 
Peer influence is considered as a major determinant of tax evasion (Alm et al., 2016). Thus, the 
findings of the current study affirm that peer influence has a significant and negative effect on income 
tax evasion. The finding shows the crucial part that peer influence plays a role in influencing the 
decision of SMEs with respect to income tax evasion. Also, the finding was found to be consistent with 
some extant studies in the domain of peer influence and tax evasion (Alm et al., 2016; Alm & Torgler, 
2006; Bobek & Hatfield, 2003; Çevik & Yeniçeri, 2013; Kirchler et al., 2008). In addition, the negative 
result is in line with the hypothesis of the current study, whereby peer influence was considered in the 
context of the Palestinian SMEs by the current study to have a direct effect on their decision concerning 
the income tax evasion. Therefore, peer influence plays a main role in controlling the income tax 
evasion among the Palestinians SMEs. 
The perception of an individual on issues of good governance is considered a determinant of tax 
evasion (Cummings et al. 2009). In this regard, Andriani (2015) showed how significant are the 
institutional trust and the rule of law towards the tax evasion decision, including the settings of a weak 
formal institution. The current study reveals that offering bribe to tax officials does not significantly 
increase tax evasion among the SMEs. However, this outcome is not consistent with several early tax 
evasion studies (Alm et al., 2016; Torgler, 2005; Torgler & Schneider, 2007; Uslaner, 2010). In 
contrast, the outcome is in agreement with the findings by Imam and Jacobs (2014). The results of the 
current study can be justified by the strong determination of the present government to implement anti-
corruption policies and promote the efficiency of its public sector. The corrupted government officials 
were charged and prosecuted, and the appointments were appropriately scrutinised to ensure they have 
uncorrupted personalities. Therefore, the above scenarios could account for the reason why bribery 
failed to have a significant influence on tax evasion in the context of the Palestinian SMEs. 
7. Conclusion, Limitations and Future Research 
Taxation is the most realistic channel for sourcing revenues by the governments in order to 
finance the development projects in the country. Nevertheless, tax evasion issue has undermined the 
government’s capability to generate or maximize the expected revenue from taxation for the purpose of 
financing the developmental projects. In the context of Palestine, the Palestinian government depends 
heavily on taxation which is a major sustainable revenue source. Hence, the current study is focused on 
the income tax of SMEs taxpayers, they constitute a vital segment of Palestinian taxpayers. In this 
regard, the SMEs are potentially a large source of tax revenue generation, but they are curtailed by the 
high rate of tax evasion. Consequently, controlling the rate of tax evasion by SMEs will aid in raising 
the value of revenue generation by the government. In general, the outcome of the present study 
indicated that tax fairness and peer influence are negatively associated with the income tax evasion, 
however corruption was found to be insignificantly associated with the income tax evasion. 
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Consequently, the present study has contributed to the existing literature with respect to some major 
determinants of income tax evasion. However, the present study has some limitations, whereby the use 
of the structured questionnaires poses a major limitation, as it may not represent the honest answers of 
importers or actual behaviour. Hence, a mixed method approach is needed. Future studies may also 
consider broadening the model by including other unproven factors from the socio-psychological 
factors such as, tax knowledge, tax service quality, patriotism, religion, external audit, and trust in the 
government 
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